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THE SECOND CuIcuIT REFusES To EXTEND BEGGARS A
HELPING HAND: YOUNG V. NEW YORK CITY
TRANSIT A UTHORITY
In Young v. New York City Transit Authority,1 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit asserted that panhandling in the New
York City subway system did not fall within the first amendment.2 The
court reasoned that panhandling was not expressive conduct and distin-
guished the Schaumburg trilogy of cases,3 holding that the first amend-
ment protects charitable solicitation. This treatment of panhandling
1. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990).
2. Id. at 153-57. The Legal Action Center for the Homeless filed suit on behalf of itself and
two homeless men as representatives of a class of needy persons who beg in the New York City
subway. They challenged a New York City Transit Authority regulation prohibiting begging in the
subway system. The regulation allowed solicitation for charitable, religious, or political causes in
certain areas of the subway system. The New York City Transit Authority created the regulation to
facilitate safe, effective, and reliable subway transportation. This ban on begging was partially re-
sponsive to a study finding that subway riders felt harassed and intimidated by beggars. The regula-
tion also addressed the practical dilemma faced by police officers who had to distinguish between
panhandling and extortion. Id. at 148-50.
The District Court held panhandling indistinguishable from charitable solicitation and, thus, was
entitled to first amendment protection. Id. at 150-52. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
even if panhandling was protected by the first amendment, the regulation in question did not violate
the more lenient standard of review called for in this case. Id. at 157. The ban on panhandling was
intended to further a governmental interest unrelated to the "communicative nature of conduct."
Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2540 (1989)). The regulation, therefore, was entitled
to the standard of review employed in United States v. O'Bien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Pursuant to
the O'Brien standard, the Young court concluded that the Transit Authority regulation did not
violate the first amendment because: "(1) 'it is within the constitutional power of the Government;'
(2) 'it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;' (3) 'the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression;' and (4) 'the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.'" Young,
903 F.2d at 157 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
Prior to reaching this conclusion, however, the Young court discussed "whether begging consti-
tutes the kind of'expressive conduct' protected to some extent by the First Amendment." Id. at 153.
The Young court concluded that most beggars had no intent to convey a particularized message and
that observers were unlikely to understand any message beyond the desire for money. Id. at 153-54.
See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. The Young majority then distinguished begging from
charitable solicitation. Young, 903 F.2d at 155-57. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
The dissent, however, agreed with the District Court that begging was indistinguishable from chari-
table solicitation and was entitled to first amendment protection. Young, 903 F.2d at 164. See infra
note 64.
3. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Secretary of State v. Joseph
A. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
444 U.S. 620 (1980)). Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788
(1985) is a similar case. In Cornelius, the Supreme Court ruled that the first amendment protected
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implies that begging in other contexts is unprotected4 and confines
Schaumburg to the charitable solicitation context.5
Panhandling or begging 6 may involve conduct (extension of a hand or
cup) and speech (verbally asking for a handout). This activity is pro-
tected by the freedom of speech if: 1) a panhandler's request for money
is commercial speech; 2) panhandling conveys a "particularized
message;" 7 or 3) panhandling is so "inextricably intertwined with
speech" 8 that it should be protected directly.9 The Young court rejected
all three and concluded that begging in the New York City subway was
not a form of speech protected by the first amendment.'"
In determining whether a particular activity is protected, one must ask
exactly what the first amendment freedom of speech encompasses."I One
could interpret the freedom of speech to protect only written or spoken
words.'" This view, however, is far from satisfactory.' 3 The first amend-
charitable solicitation of federal employees through the Combined Federal Campaign Form, a 30-
word written statement.
4. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
6. The District Court cited various dictionaries and determined that panhandling and begging
were synonymous. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 350-351 (S.D.N.Y.
1990). This Recent Development affords the terms similar treatment.
7. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
8. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-7, at 829 (2d ed. 1988).
9. See, eg., Village of Schaumnburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. at 632
(charitable solicitations "involve a variety of speech interests... that are within the protection of the
First Amendment").
10. Young, 903 F.2d at 154-56.
11. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech . . . ." U.S. CONST.,
amend. L The first amendment freedom of speech is applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 749 n.1 (1976).
12. But see, Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term - Forward: On Drawing Lines, 82
HARV. L. REV. 63, 79-80 (1968); Note, First Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84
COLUM. L. REy. 467, 469-71 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Ambiguous Conduct]. The first amendment
also could be interpreted to protect only political speech. See generally Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1 (1971); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). But see M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 3.01 at 3-2 - 3-9 (1984) (disputing this view). Those commentators who advocate first
amendment protection for political speech alone claim that the first amendment is designed to pro-
tect discussions of problems properly dealt with by government. Id. at 3-6.
The Continental Congress, however, recognized the advancement of truth, science, morality, the
arts, and the administration of government as important interests furthered by the first amendment.
1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789 108 (Ford ed. 1904). Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has noted these interests. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 186 (1979) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 288-289 n.2 (1974) (Doug-
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ment's primary concern is the free expression of ideas,14 not merely the
free use of words.15 As Professor Tribe points out, "[a]ll communication
except perhaps that of the extrasensory variety involves conduct."16 In
fact, all communication is symbolic, whether consisting of conduct or the
written or spoken word. 7 Speaking, after all, is nothing but the use of
symbolic sounds, while writing is the use of symbolic markings." If con-
duct both intends and does in fact communicate an idea, the first amend-
ment should protect it.19 Indeed, since at least 1931,20 the Supreme
Court has recognized that communicative conduct may be protected by
the first amendment.2'
The Supreme Court, however, has refused to extend first amendment
protection to all conduct with some "kernel of expression. '2 2 The chal-
las, J., concurring); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 42 (1971) (plurality opinion); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967) (plurality opinion); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957).
A simple example illustrates the importance of freedom of speech to science. In the Soviet Union,
speech that may harm the courtry can be punished. J. LIEBERMAN, FREE SPEECH, FREE PRESS
AND THE LAW 11 (1980). Of course, those in power decide what may harm the country. Id. In the
1930's, a Russian agronomist believed that plants could inherit characteristics they acquired while
growing. Id. Although this belief was incorrect, other scientists were unable to disagree publicly
because this theory was supported by those in power. Id. The result was serious harm to Soviet
agriculture. Id.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court never has adopted the view that only political speech is protected.
See M. NIMMER, supra at 3-3 n.5 (listing cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized non-
political speech as falling under first amendment protection).
13. Henkin, supra note 12, at 80-82; Note, Ambiguous Conduct, supra note 12, at 471.
14. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
15. M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 3.06[B], at 3-42 - 3-43.
16. L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 12-7, at 827. See also Henkin, supra note 12, at 79-80.
17. M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 3.06[B], at 3-42. Indeed some speech is only conduct with no
expressive content. Id. § 3.05, at 3-3 .
18. Id. § 3.06[B], at 3-42.
19. Henkin, supra note 12, at 79. Such treatment of communicative conduct "enables a larger,
more diverse group of people to communicate, promotes the communicaton of a wider variety of
messages, and exposes a larger group of people to some communication." Note, Ambiguous Con-
duct, supra note 12, at 471.
20. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931) (invalidating a state law prohibiting pub-
lic display of "any flag, badge, banner or device ... as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to
organized government"). See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2539 (1989) (invalidating a
state law prohibiting desecration of the American flag).
21. See M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 3.06[A], at 3-37 n.2 (listing contract, evidence, and
trademark as other areas in which the law recognizes that conduct may be expressive).
22. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (1989) ("It is possible to find some
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes... but such a kernel is not suffi-
cient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment"); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct
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lenge, then, is to define conduct that is properly shielded by the freedom
of speech. Subsequent courts have struggled23 and continue to struggle
with this problem.24
Prior to 1974, the Supreme Court had no real test for expressive con-
duct, relying instead on an alleged distinction between speech and con-
duct.25 When denying first amendment protection to conduct, the Court
employed the "speech plus" approach26 and divided the questionable ac-
tion into two parts: speech and conduct (the "plus"). 27 Under this ap-
proach, the Court often sustained regulation of the conduct while
prohibiting regulation of the speech.28 Alternatively, the Court invoked
the "pure speech" approach to protect the conduct in question.29 Under
this approach, the Court characterized the conduct as "akin to pure
speech" and extended it the highest level of protection.30
This labeling process failed to explain the Court's analytical process;
instead it merely announced the Court's conclusion that the conduct
should or should not be protected a.3  The problem with this labeling ap-
can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea").
23. In Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), the Court determined that the first
amendment protected a peaceful parade through state grounds. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559,
564 (1965), however, the Court refused to extend the same degree of first amendment protection to
essentially the same conduct as in Edwards. See infra notes 25-41 and accompanying text.
24. The struggle continues, as evidenced by the disagreement among the members of the Sec-
ond Circuit panel in Young.
25. L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 827; See Note, Ambiguous Conduct, supra note 12, at 473 (sug-
gesting that the court followed three approaches to expressive conduct cases: (1) "fails anyway;"
(2) "speech plus;" or (3) "pure speech". See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of "speech plus" and "pure speech." The "fails anyway" method allowed the Supreme Court to
avoid deciding whether the conduct was expressive. The Court instead would hold that, even if the
act was expressive, it could not satisfy the level of scrutiny appropriate in the given case. Note,
Ambiguous Conduct, supra note 12, at 473. For example, in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
376-77 (1968), the Court assumed expressive conduct, but found no violation of the First Amend-
ment. This is essentially the approach the Young court employed.
26. Note, Ambiguous Conduct, supra note 12, at 473.
27. Id. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 826. The phrase "speech plus" originated with
Justice Frankfurter in Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957).
28. Note, Ambiguous Conduct, supra note 12, at 471. But see Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131 (1966) (silent demonstration on public library premises is protected speech); Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War is
protected speech).
29. Note, Ambiguous Conduct, supra note 12, at 474.
30. Id.
31. L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 827; Note, Ambiguous Conduct, supra note 12, at 475 ("At-
tempts to separate speech and conduct to determine which predominates in a particular act degener-
ate 'into question-begging judgements about whether the activity should be protected.' "(quoting
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proach is that it rests on the assumption that activities can be separated
into speech and nonexpressive conduct.32 This premise is invalid be-
cause, as stated earlier, all communication contains an element of con-
duct.33 The refusal not to extend first amendment protection to the
conduct element thus begs the ultimate question of whether the conduct
is expressive.34 The Supreme Court, possibly recognizing these inconsis-
tencies, finally abandoned this approach in 1974 when it decided Spence
v. Washington.35
In Spence the Court adopted a two-part test to determine whether the
first amendment protects expressive conduct. First, the Court asked
whether the actor intended "to convey a particularized message." Sec-
ond, the Court queried whether an observer would be likely to under-
stand the intended message.36 The first part focuses on the
communicative intent of the actor, while the second focuses on the com-
municative nature of the action.37 Both parts serve the underlying pur-
poses of the first amendment: "(1) individual self-fulfillment; (2) the
advance of knowledge and discovery of truth; (3) participation in deci-
sionmaking by all members of society; and (4) maintenance of the proper
balance between stability and change."38
The requirement that the actor intend to convey a particularized
message promotes individual self-fulfillment and allows individual mem-
bers of society to participate in the decisionmaking process. 39 The sec-
ond Spence requisite, that the conduct actually convey the message
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amend-
ment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1495 (1975)). But see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE-
DOM OF EXPRESSION 290-298 (1970) (advocating separating expression and action to determine
which element predominates).
32. Note, Ambiguous Conduct, supra note 12, at 474.
33. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. "Expression and conduct, message and me-
dium, are thus inextricably tied together in all communicative behavior." L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at
827.
34. Note, Ambiguous Conduct, supra note 12, at 475.
35. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
36. Id. at 410-11. The Supreme Court employed the Spence test as recently as 1989 in Texas v.
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (burning of United States flag during the Republican National
Convention was expressive conduct protected by the first amendment).
37. Note, Ambiguous Conduct, supra note 12, at 476-77.
38. Id. at 477 n.62. See also, Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 720, 730 (1982) ("The first amendment protects three distinct interests: those of
the speaker, the listener, and the communications process itself"). There are, of course, other inter-
ests advanced by the first amendment freedom of speech. See M. NIMMER, supra note 12 § 1.01-
1.04, at 1-2 - 1-54.
39. Note, Ambiguous Conduct, supra note 12, at 477.
1991]
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intended, promotes the remaining interests of the first amendment.40
Only when a message is actually communicated can knowledge be con-
veyed and can the act take any part in the balancing of stability and
change.41
Certain conduct, however, is protected not because of its communica-
tive nature, but because it gives rise to traditional first amendment activi-
ties.42 This type of conduct, while noncommunicative in itself, is so fused
with traditional first amendment activities that the Court has extended it
first amendment protection. Expressive conduct and this type of
noncommunicative conduct differ in that the latter creates opportunities
for, and normally accompanies, traditional first amendment activities. In
a line of cases beginning with Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Environment,43 the Supreme Court recognized charitable solicita-
tion as one such type of protected conduct.44
In Schaumburg, the Court struck down a municipal ordinance that
prohibited door-to-door solicitation unless the organization could show
that at least 75 percent of the funds collected would be used for charita-
ble purposes.45 The Court reasoned that "solicitation is characteristi-
cally intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech" and
"that without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy
would likely cease."" In dictum, the Court extended this rationale from
door-to-door fund-raising to charitable solicitation generally. 47
In later cases,48 the Supreme Court followed Schaumburg, but only
relied on the nexus between charitable solicitation and traditional first
40. Id. at 478.
41. Id.
42. L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 829 (listing distribution of leaflets and pamphlets, political can-
vassing, charitable solicitation, mailbox stuffing, picketing, civil rights demonstrations, communica-
tions with government and posting outdoor placards as examples of areas entitled to such
protection).
43. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
44. See, e.g., id. at 632 (charitable solicitations "involve a variety of speech interests - commu-
nication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of
causes - that are within the protection of the First Amendment").
45. Id. at 639.
46. Id. at 632.
47. Id. ("Prior authorities, therefore, clearly establish that charitable appeals for funds, on the
street or door to door, involve a variety of speech interests.., that are within the protection of the
First Amendment.") (emphasis added).
48. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Secretary of State v. Joseph A.
Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
[Vol. 69:969
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amendment activities.4 9 The Schaumburg line of cases, therefore, stands
for the view that charitable solicitation often gives rise to protected
speech5" and, perhaps secondarily, that a charity's protected speech
would be impossible without solicitation.51 Significantly, Schaumburg
and its progeny protect charitable solicitation not because it "convey[s] a
particularized message" 52 that is likely to be understood,5" but rather
because such activity is "inextricably intertwined with speech."54
The Young court analyzed panhandling under the Spence test and re-
fused to apply the Schaumburg approach.55 Under the first Spence fac-
tor,56 the Young court stated that most panhandlers have no intent to
convey a particularized message.57 Panhandlers have no social or polit-
ical message to convey, but beg simply to collect money. 58  As to the
second prong of the Spence test, the Court reasoned that even if a beggar
49. In Munson, a professional fundraiser challenged a state statute virtually identical to the
ordinance struck down in Schaumburg. Munson, 467 U.S. at 949-50. The Court protected the fun-
draising because these solicitations often give rise to protected activities such as the "dissemination
of information, discussion, and advocacy of public issues." Id. (quoting Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 635 (1980)). Similarly, in Riley, the Court struck
down a state statute regulating the conduct of professional fundraisers engaging in charitable solici-
tation. Riley, 487 U.S. at 784. The Riley court again held that charitable solicitation is protected by
the first amendment because charitable solicitation includes other elements of protected speech. Id.
at 787-88.
50. See Munson, 467 U.S. at 959-60; Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
51. This justification may be less important since the Court did not repeat it in Riley or
Munson.
52. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974).
53. Id. None of the Schaumburg trilogy of cases applied the Spence test of expressive conduct.
See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
54. L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 12-7, at 829.
55. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 154-57 (2d Cir. 1990). The Young
majority began its analysis by asserting "that begging is much more 'conduct' than it is 'speech.'"
Id. at 153. This statement smacks of the "speech plus" approach employed by the Supreme Court
prior to Spence. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
57. Young, 903 F.2d at 153. The Young court first stated that for conduct to satisfy this Spence
requirement, it must be "inseparably intertwined with a 'particularized message.'" Id. This state-
ment appears to create too high a standard. Spence simply required that the actor intend a "particu-
larized message." Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-411. The Young court seemed to require that the conduct
be commonly understood as communicating a particular message. Young, 903 F.2d at 154 (only
message common to all acts of begging is the desire to extract money). Such a standard is too
stringent for the first Spence factor, see supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
58. Young, 903 F.2d at 153-54. The Young court asserted that a message designed to collect
money rather than to convey a social or political message was unprotected. Id. Such an assertion is
inconsistent with the first amendment protection afforded commercial speech. See, eg., Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (extending first
amendment coverage to commercial speech). See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
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had the requisite intent, there is little likelihood that a "particularized
message" would be understood.5 9 The Young court therefore concluded
that the first amendment protects neither verbal nor nonverbal begging.60
In reaching this conclusion, the Young court conceded that beggars
effectively convey their requests for money. However, the Court asserted
that such messages "fall[] far outside the scope of protected speech under
the first amendment."61 Thus, the court implicitly concluded that a beg-
gar's plea does not propose a commercial transaction and is therefore not
entitled to even the low level of first amendment protection reserved for
commercial speech.62
The Young court then distinguished the Schaumburg trilogy of cases 63
on the ground that they involved a "nexus between solicitation and tradi-
tional first amendment activities" that panhandling lacks.64 The Young
court instead likened panhandling to a public nuisance65 and implied that
the first amendment does not protect speech amounting to a public
nuisance.
66
59. Young, 903 F.2d at 154. The Young court pointed out that most subway passengers are
unlikely to understand a particularized message because of the transgressive nature of begging. Id.
60. Id. The Young court stated that any speech concerning the plight of the homeless
prompted by begging was not at issue. The occurrence of such speech supports the proposition that
the conduct is inextricably intertwined with traditional first amendment activities. See, e.g., Village
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). The primary reason for
protecting such activity, after all, is precisely because it gives rise to protected speech.
61. Young, 903 F.2d at 154.
62. See, eg., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (extending first amendment coverage to commercial speech); Posados De Puerto Rico
Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (advertisements for casino gambling are a protected
form of commercial speech).
63. See supra note 3.
64. Young, 903 F.2d at 155. The dissent in Young concluded that begging and charitable solici-
tation are legally indistinguishable. Id. at 164. The dissent pointed out that charitable solicitation is
protected whether or not traditional first amendment activities actually occur. Id. at 165. Charitable
solicitation is protected because it affords the charity an opportunity to discuss its views with poten-
tial donors and because it provides the funds necessary for the charity to continue its advocations.
Id. Begging in the New York subway, according to the dissent, is exactly like charitable solicitation
in these respects. Id. The dissent emphasized the plaintiffs' testimony that they frequently had con-
versations with subway riders while begging and that they needed the funds obtained in this manner
to continue these conversations. Id. at 165-66. Although the dissent's argument is plausible, it
misses the point. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
65. Id. at 156. The court articulated the difference between begging and charitable solicitation
by organized charities as one of function: the latter "serve the community interests by enhancing
communication and disseminating ideas, the conduct of begging and panhandling in the subway
amounts to nothing less than a menace to the common good." Id.
66. Young, 903 F.2d at 154. The fact that begging is an inconvenience would bear on the
reasonableness of the regulation, but it would not make begging unprotected. The assertion in
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/14
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Although the Young court failed to explain the distinction between a
public nuisance and legitimate first amendment activity, there is a funda-
mental difference between organized charitable solicitation and begging
by the homeless.6' Schaumburg held that charitable solicitation is pro-
tected because it often gives rise to traditional first amendment activities
and because the funds solicited ultimately are used for that purpose.6"
Begging, however, is characterized by neither of these traits.
Organized charities exist to advocate some course of action, a goal that
the first amendment seeks to protect.69 The funds solicited by charities
ultimately further this goal. Although beggars probably are more in
need of donations than organized charities, beggars normally do not use
solicited funds to advocate improvements for the homeless. Thus, beg-
ging is not inextricably bound-up with first amendment concerns.
The Young court's analysis most likely will deny first amendment pro-
Young to the opposite effect is essentially unsupported. The Young court cited Members of the City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984), and Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949). Young, 903 F.2d at 156. These cases held that states could regulate speech
that was a public nuisance even though such speech was protected by the first amendment. Vincent,
466 U.S. at 805; Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 83.
Similarly, the Young court's citation of the Schaumburg dissent as support for the proposition
that a public nuisance is unprotected is misplaced. Id. at 156 (citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citi-
zens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 644 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). Justice Rehn-
quist was merely advocating that the regulation of door-to-door solicitation, an admittedly protected
activity, did not exceed constitutionally permissible bounds. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 644.
In Young, there was evidence before the court that begging frequently occasioned conversations
with passengers regarding conditions of the homeless. Young, 903 F.2d at 154, 165. The fact that
these conversations occurred in an unpleasant manner should not affect the threshhold question of
whether begging is protected speech. Indeed, the Schaumburg court did not consider the villagers'
desire to be left alone in determining whether charitable solicitation should be protected. Schaum-
burg, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). If a sufficient nexus exists between begging and traditional first amend-
ment activities, the court then can weigh competing interests to determine if the regulation is
constitutional. See, e.g., id. at 639 (holding regulation invalid because it was too tenuously related to
the valid governmental interests).
Another question implicitly raised by the Young case is how a court is to determine whether a
sufficient nexus exists. The Supreme Court seems to base these decisions on common knowledge
rather than on specific evidence before the court. Young, 903 F.2d at 156. The Young court simi-
larly disregarded specific evidence that conversations were frequent and concluded that begging does
not enhance communication or dissemination of ideas. Id. at 154-56. See Rosenfeld, Does Odysseus
Ride the 'A' Train?, N.Y. L. J., June 4, 1990, at 2 (suggesting that none of the learned judges who
decided this case probably ever changed trains at Columbus Circle).
67. See Young, 903 F.2d at 155-56.
68. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 630 (1980).
69. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Charities directly participate in the advance of
knowledge and discovery of truth, assist more members of society to participate in decisionmaking
and help maintain the proper balance between stability and change.
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tection to begging everywhere. 0 Although Young placed great emphasis
on the disruptive effect of panhandling in the subway system,7 this effect
had little bearing on the threslhhold question of whether, under the
Spence test, panhandling is expressive conduct entitled to first amend-
ment protection.72 The conclusion that most beggars intend no particu-
larized message depends very little on where the begging actually takes
place. Similarly, in few instances will an observer likely understand a
particularized message even if one is intended. Thus, Young seems to
foreclose claims that panhandling is expressive conduct, no matter where
it takes place.73
The Young court also implicitly denied that a beggar's request for
money is a form of commercial speech protected by the first amend-
ment.74 Future litigants, however, appear to have a plausible argument
that panhandlers are engaging in protected commercial speech.
In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil,75 the Supreme Court protected commercial speech because it facili-
tates the free flow of information and resources throughout the
economy.76 The Court reasoned that our free market economy requires
an educated consumer properly to allocate resources.77 In addition, the
free flow of commercial information enlightens opinions as to how the
free enterprise system should be regulated or altered.78
The same first amendment interests that are served by protecting com-
mercial speech79 would be served by protecting a beggar's request for
money. A prohibition on begging may prevent many people from learn-
ing about the prevalence and plight of the homeless. This in turn may
lower the level of resources that otherwise would flow to the homeless
70. See Panhandlers Hope Supreme Court Will be Generous, L.A. Times, May 12, 1990, at AI8,
col. I (home ed.) (noting that a similar case has been filed in California); Subway Begging: New York
Advocates Seek Rehearing, The Christian Science Monitor, May 30, 1990, at 8 (Young case will
encourage communities across the nation to remove beggars from sight).
71. Young, 903 F.2d at 149-50, 154.
72. Id. at 152-157. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
73. Of course, certain circumstances could make begging expressive conduct. For example, a
congregation of beggars in front of the White House could be expressive conduct under the Spence
test (see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text). Most forms of everyday begging, however, most
likely will suffer the same fate as that in the New York subway.
74. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
75. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
76. Id. at 764-65.
77. Id. at 765.
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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and may reduce support for aid to the homeless.80 The Young decision
failed to address this issue, and should pose no obstacle to future litigants
in other jurisdictions.
The Young decision dealt a crippling blow to panhandlers everywhere.
Because Young asserted that the first amendment does not protect beg-
ging, states are free to regulate or prohibit begging as they see fit. The
only recourse left to beggars, at least in the Second Circuit, is to appeal to
elected representatives.
Aaron Johnson
80. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
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